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Reply to Iglesias 
 
 
Manuel Iglesias is concerned with the senses (or uses) of ‘literal’ and ‘nonliteral’ in 
ordinary language. The cluster of uses that he finds in ordinary speech is, he says, 
perfectly in order as it stands. There is no need to reduce some of the senses to 
others, considered as more fundamental or basic. So Iglesias criticizes the contrast I 
draw between the technical notion of literality prominent in the philosophy of 
language (where ‘literal’ means something like ‘determined by the semantic 
conventions of the language’), and the ordinary notion. According to Iglesias, « all 
technical notions of ‘literal’ have correlates in ordinary language », and in any case, 
« there is no single or paradigmatic ordinary sense ». 
I think that Iglesias and I agree on the essentials, so my discussion will be 
brief. We agree that there are a number of ‘layers of meaning’ that must be 
distinguished, each layer corresponding to a different step of interpretation. 
« Relative to each step », Iglesias says, ‘literal’ refers to the input of the step of 
interpretation and ‘nonliteral’ to the output. » But not all utterances involve all the 
interpretive steps. For example, some utterances (those that I classify as ‘p-literal’) 
do not involve the step from a ‘primary’ meaning to a ‘secondary’ meaning derived 
through e.g. conversational implicature ; utterances of nonindexical sentences do not 
involve the interpretive step which I call ‘saturation’, namely the assignment of 
contextual values to indexical variables ; etc. In order to  maintain a common grid of 
analysis (with a fixed number of interpretive steps) for every utterance, Iglesias 
suggests that we handle such cases by saying that the output of the (superfluous) 
step is the same as its input. So for nonindexical sentences the pre-saturation 
meaning coincides with the post-saturation meaning. In this framework Iglesias 
makes the following proposal : an utterance is literal (with respect to a given 
interpretive step) iff the input of the step coincides with its input. So there will be as 
many senses of ‘literal’ as there are interpretive steps in the grid. 
I welcome the proposal ; so where do Iglesias and I differ ? Well, as I said, he 
criticizes me for attempting to reduce the plurality of uses of the literal/nonliteral 
distinction in ordinary speech to a basic core. With respect to the uses that do not 
correspond to that core, he objects to my dismissing them as technical uses of the 
distinction. He points out that we find such uses in ordinary speech as much as in the 
writings of language theorists. And he attempts to show that the alleged core which I 
discern in the ordinary uses of the literal/nonliteral distinction is based on a condition 
that is either too weak or too strong to do the work I expect it to do. 
The first thing I want to say in response to that criticism is that I am not 
concerned with the analysis of ordinary usage, appearances notwithstanding. I know 
that in my paper ‘Literal/nonliteral’ and in the chapter of Literal Meaning which is 
based on that paper I give that impression by constantly speaking of the ordinary 
sense of ‘literal’. I apologize for that misleading formulation. When I speak of the 
ordinary sense of ‘literal’, what I really mean to be talking about is : what is literal (or 
nonliteral) for the ordinary user of the language (rather than for the language 
theorist). Let me elaborate. 
Philosophers of language use ‘literal’ and ‘nonliteral’ in a sense which has to 
do with conformity to the linguistic conventions, at different levels. I hold that the 
literal/nonliteral distinction, thus understood, is not something which ordinary users of 
the language spontaneously and systematically pay attention to when they talk or 
when they process the speech of others. Free enrichment, for example, is pervasive 
but passes unnoticed most of the time. It is not perceived as nonliteral, even though 
technically it is. That is what I mean when I contrast the technical sense and the 
ordinary sense. An utterance counts as ‘nonliteral in the ordinary sense’ if and only if 
it is perceived as such by the ordinary user of the language. An utterance which does 
not counts as ‘nonliteral in the ordinary sense’ in this framework may still be classified 
as ‘nonliteral’ in ordinary speech, in an appropriate context. That is what Iglesias’s 
examples show. But it has never been my intention to deny that the literal/nonliteral 
distinction which philosophers of language typically invoke can be appealed to also in 
ordinary speech. I agree with Iglesias that it can, but I think this is irrelevant to my 
point. My point is that there is a form of nonliterality that is transparent and conscious, 
and another form that is not. This is the contrast I have in mind, between the 
technical and the ordinary notion of nonliterality. 
But Iglesias does not think that we can make sense of my suggestion that 
there is a form of nonliterality that corresponds to the users’ perception of 
nonliterality. I draw a distinction between the cases of nonliterality that satisfy the 
‘transparency condition’, i.e., that are perceived as nonliteral by the ordinary users of 
the language (implicatures, indirect speech acts, figurative uses) and the cases that 
count as nonliteral only by the theorist’s lights (free enrichment, below-treshold 
loosening and transfer). Iglesias objects that the transparency condition is either too 
weak or too strong. It is too weak if what we’re talking about is potential perception, 
because free enrichment also can be perceived as nonliteral, even though normally it 
is not.1 It is too strong if what we’re talking about is actual perception : for even 
implicatures, he says, are often grasped directly, at a sub-personal level, without 
being perceived as supplementing the literal meaning of the utterance. 
Let me deal with the two sides of the objection in turn. Regarding implicatures, 
I have already responded to a similar charge in the published version of Literal 
Meaning (distinct from the earlier version which Iglesias used for his presentation at 
the Granada conference). Even if sometimes implicatures are arrived at ‘directly’ or 
(as Grice says) ‘intuitively’, still they count as implicatures only if the interpreter is 
aware of the inferential link between the implicature and the speaker’s locutionary 
act. That means that the implicature must be perceived as distinct from what is said, 
thereby satisfying the transparency condition. To sum up : An implicature may be 
processed sub-personally, as Iglesias says,  but even in that case the output of the 
process must be available to the subject as distinct from what is said (which must 
also be available).  
As regards Iglesias’s claim that « meaning enrichment and loosening can also 
be perceived by language users », I think it is somewhat ambiguous. On a first 
reading, what is claimed is that an aspect of nonliteral meaning that is not actually 
perceived as such could be so perceived : it would be so perceived if e.g. the 
speaker had been instructed to pay attention etc. (See Kent Bach on the ‘educability’ 
of our intuitions.) On a second reading, what is claimed is that sometimes a primary 
pragmatic process of enrichment or below-threshold sense extension  is actually 
detected by the users. Now the claim is hard to make sense of on this second 
reading. How could a case of below-threshold sense extension be actually detected 
by the language users, without thereby becoming a case of above-threshold sense 
extension ? This is a difficulty for Iglesias if he wishes to maintain the objection in this 
form. 
                                            
1 A similar point has been made by Kent Bach and by Jonathan Berg (and also by 
Carston in her contribution to this volume). 
With respect to the first reading, I agree that we can become aware of some 
nonliteral aspect of the (primary) meaning of an utterance, by exercising our reflective 
abilities ; but — this is the crucial point —this reflective abillty with which we may 
credit the ordinary user of the language is not constitutive of the ability to 
communicate at the primary level. Enrichment, loosening, and transfer could still take 
place even if the language users were deprived of this reflective ability. In the case of 
implicatures and indirect speech acts, the situation is different : without a modicum of 
reflective ability, no implicature could ever be derived. 
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